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NOTES AND COMMENT
court explains the method of exercising choice by stating that the-elec-
tion to enter and mitigate damages must be manifested by an un-
equivocal act. If the act is equivocal, it will be presumed that a sur-
render has been accepted. The case points out that mere entering would
be an equivocal act and would lead to a surrender, but, as was done in
this case, entering and placing "For Rent" signs in the windows was
such a manifestation of intent to mitigate that no surrender could be
presumed.
Other issues in the case were decided on what is settled law in Wis-
consin except one defence offered by Clarke, the guarantor. He con-
tended that he was not liable under the lease because the contract of
guaranty was executed on Sunday in contravention of 351.46, Stats.
The court pointed out that although the contract of guaranty was
actually executed on Sunday, it was dated as of the following Monday
and was not delivered until then, and the lessor, there being no dis-
closure of this fact, could not be defeated in his cause. The court
established the rule that a party acting in good faith, not having par-
ticipated in the execution of the Sunday contract, can rely on the con-
tract for a: cause of action.' Many cases were considered to determine
the sagacity of such a rule and practically all Wisconsin cases 2 on Sun-
day contracts were considered in an attempt to find a reason for the
barring of such a rule in Wisconsin. None was found.
LEwis A. STOCKING
Vendor and Vendee: Real Property: Risk of Loss: Insurance.
R., defendant and vendor, agreed, by written contract, to sell certain
real estate to A., plaintiff and vendee. A deposit was made. The bal-
ance of the purchase price was to be paid upon delivery of the deed.
Meanwhile, before the completion of the sale, a portion of the prop-
erty was, without the negligence of the vendor, materially damaged by
fire. R. had insured the property for his own benefit for a sum far
in excess of his sale price.
No provision'was made in the contract of sale on the subject of in-
surance. Because of the damage, such performance as was contem-
'Diamond Glass Co. v. Gould, (N.J. Sup.), 61 At]. 2; Collins v. Collins, 139
Iowa, 703, 117 N.W. 1089; Hall v. Parker, 37 Mich. 590, 26 Am. Rep. 540; King
v, Fleming, 72 Ill. 21, 22 Am. Rep. 131; Evansville v. Morris, 87 Ind. 269, 44
Am. Rep. 763; Gibbs & Sterrett Mfg. Co. v. Brucker, 111 U.S. 597, 28 L. ed. 534.
2 Moore v. Kendall, 2 Pin. 99, 52 Am. Dec. 145; Hill v. Sherwood, 3 Wis. 343;
Melchior v. McCarty, 31 Wis. 252, 11 Am. Rep. 605; Knox v. Clifford, 38 Wis.
651, 20 Am. Rep 28; Troewert v. Decker, 51 Wis. 46, 8 N.W. 26, 3 Am. Rep.
808; DeForth v. Wisconsin & M. R. Co., 52 Wis. 320, 9'N.W. 17, 38 Am, Rep.
737.
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plated by the contract, became impossible. A. claimed it would be
entitled to the insurance money if it were to perform under the con-
tract. R. offered to return the deposit money, and denied that A. had
any right to the insurance money. The vendee, A., then elected to
carry out the contract and demanded a deed from R. R. made the
conveyance, without prejudice to the vendor's right to the insurance
money. The property was accepted in its destroyed condition by A.,
which then sought to recover the insurance money. Held, That the loss
was sustained by the vendor, R.; that he was entitled to the insurance
money; and that the vendee, A., was entitled to rescission of the con-
tract. Appleton Electric Co. v. Rogers et al. (Wis.) 228 N.W. 505.
Authorities are divided on the question as to whether the vendor or
vendee shall recover the insurance money under a policy procured by
the vendor for his own benefit, where it happens that real estate, after
being sold by contract, is damaged by fire before the payment of the
balance of the purchase price and the delivery of the deed. Under the
equitable theory, as stated in Order of Eagles v. Weatherby, 82 N.J.
Eq. 455, 88 Atl. 847, the vendee is regarded as the owner in equity of
the property. The vendor is considered as retaining the legal title
simply as trustee and as security for the balance of the purchase price.
Because of the equitable relation of the parties, the court concluded in
the New Jersey case that the "money accruing on a policy of insur-
ance, where the loss has occurred subsequent to the execution of the
contract, will, in equity, inure to the benefit of the vendee; the vendor
still retaining his character as trustee, and the insurance money in his
hands representing the property that has been destroyed." In other
words, the risk of loss passes to the vendee at the time the contract of
sale is entered into because he then becomes the equitable owner.
While, according to the other view, until such time as the vendee is
entitled to possession, the vendor must bear the loss. See Williston on
Contracts, Sections 940 and 942.
The leading case in support of the equitable theory is the English
case of Paine v. Meller, 6 Ves. Jr. 349, which held that the loss oc-
casioned by fire, after the making of the contract, falls upon the vendee.
The basis of this rule is the equitable fiction that what is agreed to be
done shall be considered as actually done. Thus, where there is an
executory contract to purchase, equity regards it as equivalent to an
actual purchase; and therefore the vendee must bear the burden of any
loss which occurs to the property at any time between the agreement
and the conveyance. Many American authorities have approved of
that view.'
1 Lombard v. Chicago Sinai Congregation, 64 Ill. 477; Mandru v. Hurnephreys,
83 W. Va. 307, 98 S.E. 259; Russell v. Elliott, 45 S.D. 184, 186 N.W. 824; Skin-
NOTES AND COMMENT
On the other hand, the legal or contract theory-often called the
minority view-holding that the vendor must bear the loss is based on
two contentions:
A. That as long as the vendor has possession, no title or interest is
conveyed to the vendee; and that by contract the parties intend a
transfer of all incidents of ownership only at some future time.
2
B. That where the property is destroyed, the contract may be re-
scinded and there is an excuse for non-performance because of the
failure of the consideration.
3
At law, under the contract, the property remains that of the vendor,
and the vendee is entitled to rescind and to recover back any money
paid on the purchase price; while in equity, the estate is considered as
the real property of the vendee, which carries with it all of the inci-
dents of ownership; and the deposit is regarded as belonging to the
vendor.
In Wetzler v. Duffy, 78 Wis. 170, 47 N.W. 184, it was held that the
loss from a fire fell on the vendee. In that case, however, the vendee
was in possession at the time of the fire, and was therefore the real
owner; hence that decision is not similar or contradictory to the case
of Appleton Electric Co. v. Rogers, supra.
In the Appleton Electric Co. case the plaintiff was excused from
further performance and entitled to rescind the contract because of'
the material destruction of the property. It, however, elected to com-
plete the contract, knowing of such damage and of the defendant's
willingness to repay the deposit. No doubt its object was to obtain the
insurance money by claiming it as the owner of the property. The
court held that the insurance was for the benefit of the vendor; that
the insurance policy was a personal contract between the defendant and
the insurer, with the defendant entitled to the proceeds from the in-
surance; therefore, the insurance did not run with the land. In this
case, the property had been insured at the appraised value at a time
when it was much more valuable than at the time when the contract
was executed for its sale; that is, the amount of the insurance was
much larger than the purchase price. Accordingly, each party was
ner & Sons' Dry Dock Co. v. Houghton, 92 Md. 68, 48 AtI. 85; McGinley v.
Forrest, 107 Neb. 309, 186 N.W. 74, and note in 22 A.L.R. 575; 33 Harvard Law
Rev. 813, 822.
2 Williston on Contracts, Section 940; Thompson v. Gould, 20 Pickering
(Mass.) 134; Good v. Jarrard, 93 S. Car. 229, 76 S.E. 698, 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 383.
3 Ashford v. Reese, 132 Wash. 649, 233 Pac. 29; Liblnan v. Levenson, 236 Mass.
221, 128 N.E. 13; Phinizy v. Guernsey, 111 Ga. 346, 36 S.E. 796; Wilson v.
Clark, 60 N.H. 352; Elnore v. Stephens-Russell Co., 88 Ore. 509, 171 Pac. 763.
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eager to collect the insurance money. Thus, by deciding who must bear
the loss, it would be determining who would be the gainer.
From a comparison of the two views as to the question of risk of
loss, it appears that the equitable theory is really the inequitable one,
because it is unjust in that it shifts the burden of loss on to the vendee
before he is in possession, before he is able to care for the property,
and before he may enjoy any benefits from the property. It would,
therefore, as Professor Langdell pointed out, be a wiser rule for equity
to hold that the risk should pass to the vendee on the day fixed for the
performance of the contract, or to be more exact, at the time when
the vendor offers to perform. (Obviously, much of this difficulty would
be removed if the parties themselves were to stipulate in the contract
on whom the risk is to remain and who is to insure the property.)
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has in Appleton Electric Co. v.
Rogers, supra, properly chosen to adopt the legal theory that the vendor
must bear the loss incurred in the destruction of the property, and is
thereby entitled to any insurance money payable because of the loss.
The application of the legal theory doubtless gives more accurate ex-
pression to the intention of the parties than the equitable doctrine as
set forth above.
BERNARD SOREF
